ABSTRACT
Objective:To understand the incentive effect and influencing factors of the current economic incentive policy for medical alliances in Longhua District of Shenzhen(the alliance for short) on doctors′ willingness to work at primary medical institutions(the primary for short) from the perspective of mental account, and to explore the economic incentive effect of different economic incentive distribution methods on doctors′ willingness to work at the primary.Methods:The questionnaire was designed based on mental account theory. Random sampling was made in November 2019 for a questionnaire survey among doctors in two district-level medical institutions of the alliance in Longhua District of Shenzhen. The purpose was to analyze their inclination to work at the primary and their selection preferences for economic incentive distribution methods under the current economic incentive policy. The data were analyzed by descriptive analysis, and the influencing factors of doctors′ willingness to work at the primary were analyzed by χ2 test and binary logistic regression. Results:A total of 254 valid questionnaires were collected with an effective recovery rate of 90.7%. Among the respondents, 189(74.4%) were willing to work at the primary, 168(66.1%) chose to receive the economic incentives specifically for working at the primary, and 148 people(58.3%) hoped to receive such economic incentives immediately. Education background, self-rated economic income level of doctors and different payment methods of economic incentive for working at the primary had significant effects on their willingness to work at the primary( P<0.05). Conclusions:The current economic incentive policy of the alliance can meet the demands for economic incentives in terms of doctors′ material accounts, and doctors′ overall inclination to work at the primary was strong. If the amount of economic incentives is constant, doctors preferred to receive the economic incentives specifically, mainly affected by income accounts and additional income accounts. In addition, education and self-assessment of economic income level were important factors affecting the willingness of doctors to work at the primary, which may be affected by mental accounts other than material accounts.
ABSTRACT
Luohu District of Shenzhen has implemented the global budget management mode as " surplus reward, no compensation for overspending and reasonable sharing" in the hospital group, which continued to strengthen cooperation, optimize services, reduce costs, and improve health outcomes. The authors employed the game theory to build a game model of medical alliance under Luohu global budget management mode, discussing the reasons of medical and health institution′s stronger cooperation and what could be improved in Luohu′s case. Based on the experience of Luohu total budget management, it is suggested that when implementing total budget, all localities should improve closed-loop management, expand coverage, adopt compound medical insurance payment method, promote outpatient coordination, strengthen assessment and incentives, so as to give full play to the incentive role of total budget.
ABSTRACT
Objective:To analyze, with Wuhan as an example, the problems found in the infrastructure development of China′s healthcare institutions, and put forward optimization suggestions for future epidemic prevention and control.Methods:From May to June 2020, we surveyed with questionnaires 56 healthcare institutions in Wuhan, covering such aspects as basic information of the institutions, infectious disease infrastructure readiness, and the converted wards for COVID-19. Statistical descriptions were used to analyze data so acquired.Results:The number of beds in the infectious departments of healthcare institutions in Wuhan amounted to 1.64 per 10 000 people, yet the existing 1 873 beds and about 5 000 convertible beds failed to meet the medical needs against the outbreak of COVID-19. After the outbreak, a total of 19 084 convertible beds were set up, of which general hospitals accounted for 88%; the area occupied by each converted bed in traditional Chinese medicine hospitals, hospitals of traditional and Western medicine, and maternal and child hospitals (<30.0m 2) was lower than that in general hospitals and specialist hospitals (>40.0m 2). Conclusions:Healthcare institutions should scientifically allocate " peacetime-wartime adaptive" hospital beds, optimize both the number and efficiency of these beds, and prepare for the worst scenarios, so that the infrastructure can be built and maintained in strict accordance with standards, government departments can rationally arrange infectious disease prevention and control facilities and strengthen their planning in case of emergencies.
ABSTRACT
Germany has introduced the " point method" of fee-for-service at the outpatient departments under a global budget system, in an effort to curb medical expenditure growth. The authors employed the game theory to build a physician′s game model under Germany′s point method, illustrating the causes of " increasing points" behaviors of physicians, the negative effects caused by the increase of points as well as the prevention and control measures employed by Germany and its mechanism. Point method payment has been introduced in several areas in China at their inpatient departments, which is delivered to medical service providers via the performance-based distribution model, with the providers affected in their behaviors. As a result, some areas will tend to appear such " increasing points" behaviors as competing for patients, lowering admission criteria, and raising point value. In view of Germany′s experiences, China should adopt such measures as dynamic monitoring system, disclosure of " increasing points " behaviors, perfection of hierarchical medical system, and strengthening the self-governance via medical sector′s associations.